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Abstract 
Statistical properties of transaction prices are investigated in the context of a multi­
asset extension of Kyle [1985]. Under the restriction that market makers cannot con­
dition prices on volume in other markets, Kyle's model is shown to be consistent with 
well-documented lack of predictability of individual asset prices, positive autocorrelation 
of index returns, and low cross-sectional covariance. The covariance estimator of Co­
hen, e.a. [1983] provides the right estimates of the "true" covariance. However, Kyle's 
model cannot explain the asymmetry and rank deficiency of the matrix of first-order 
autocovariances. Asymmetry obtains when the insider limits his strategies to trading a 
set of pre-determined portfolios. If these portfolios are well-diversified, the matrix of 
first-order autocovariances is asymptotically rank-deficient. If the insider uses only one 
portfolio (as when "timing the market" ), its asymptotic rank equals one, conform to the
empirical results in Gibbons and Ferson [1985]. 
J( eywords: Transaction Prices, Asymmetric Information, Asset Return Predictability,
Well-Diversified Portfolios. 
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Peter Bossaerts* 
1 Introduction 
In financial theory, the set of strategies that investors can follow (their strategy space) 
is often restricted. Short sale restrictions on investment constitute the single most im­
portant type of constraint. Other types are only rarely considered, however. This paper 
investigates the effects of restrictions on the combinations of securities that investors 
choose to buy or sell. In particular, it analyzes the effects on transaction prices if insid­
ers (better-informed investors) limit their strategies to trading a set of pre-determined 
portfolios. The paper does not try to justify such a limitation in the insiders' strategy 
space. Insiders might optimize over particular strategies because they are simple to exe­
cute or because the execution of the fully optimal, unrestricted strategy is prohibitively 
costly. In the model of this paper, the insider can implement his strategies easily through, 
for instance, trading index futures contracts. Such trading is substantially less expensive 
than trading each of the underlying securities. 
The paper argues that restrictions in insiders' strategy spaces are necessary to fully 
explain some of the well-documented intertemporal characteristics of asset returns within 
a multivariate extension of Kyle [1985]'s insider trading model. Chan [1991] has recently 
acknowledged that Kyle's model can explain some of the intertemporal characteristics of 
stock prices. This is fortunate, because the usual explanation, based on nonsynchronous 
trading, is only partially satisfactory (Lo and MacKinlay [1991 ]). Chan [1991] shows that 
Kyle's rnodel-expl&ns•staRoord·features·such.as '4m�redicl-abil1ty of-individual asset re­
turns, positive autocorrelation of index returns and low return covariances. Nevertheless, 
it cannot explain the well-documented asymmetry (Lo and MacKinlay [1990]) and rank 
deficiency (Gibbons and Ferson [1985]) of the matrix of first-order autocovariances. This 
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paper proves that, if insiders limit their strategies to trading pre-determined portfolios, 
asymmetry and rank deficiency follow. 
As in Chan [1991], but unlike in Caballe and Krishnan [1990], market makers' quotes 
can depend only on volume in their own market. In contrast to Chan [1991], however, an 
insider exploits this fact. Market makers do take into account the presence of this cross­
market arbitrageur when setting prices, hence they do not loose on average. The strategic 
behavior of the insider destroys the. asymmetry in the matrix of first-order autocovari­
ances which is obtained in Chan [1991]. It is shown, furthermore, that rank deficiency is 
incompatible with the presence of an insider who contemplates an unrestricted strategy 
space. Nevertheless, if insiders only trade pre-determined portfolios, asymmetry follows. 
If these portfolios are asymptotically well-diversified, then the matrix of first-order au­
tocovariances is rank-deficient. 
If the insider trades only one well-diversified portfolio, and this portfolio is the market, 
then she is effectively "timing the market". This means that, if market makers face an 
insider who has superior capabilities as far as market timing is concerned, they will 
set quotes such that transaction prices have an asymmetric and (asymptotically) rank­
deficient autocovariance matrix. 
The reader might wonder why a market microstructure model (in casu, Kyle's model)
is used to explain phenomena that have been observed on a daily (Gibbons and Ferson 
[1985]) or weekly (Lo and MacKinlay [1990]) level. It is true that Kyle's model makes very 
specific assumptions about the role of the agents, their information and the sequencing 
of moves. Nevertheless, it captures the essential features of trade under asymmetric in­
formation. Insiders take the initiative to submit informed orders, which are subsequently 
aggregated with orders from liquidity, or "noise" traders. These features will reappear 
with varying degree in more complicated models, such as when private information is not 
revealed for more than one trading round (Kyle [1985] also analyzes this case; recently, 
Back [1991] provided a more rigorous treatment). 
In a recent paper, Hollifield [1991], rank restrictions on the matrix of first-order 
autocovariances are obtained in a different way, by imposing a dynamic factor structure 
on the endowment processes in a representative investor asset pricing model. There is 
no asymmetric information in his model. Ferson and Gibbons [1985] also claim to have 
derived rank restrictions on the matrix of first-order autocovariances, but their pricing 
model is -linear ·irr-securities'· "betas"·;·'<tnd;·i:onsequentl.y,·is based· on ·the mean-variance 
efficiency of a portfolio (or combination of portfolios). From Roll [1977], we know that 
mean-variance efficiency does not restrict the data whatsoever. In particular, the fact 
that there exists an (unkown) portfolio that is mean-variance efficient, and, therefore, 
can represent the vector of mean returns, cannot possibly restrict the matrix of first-order 
autocovariances. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model and 
explains how it generates all but two of the stylized facts of the intertemporal behavior 
of asset prices. Section 3 introduces restrictions on the insider's strategies that explain 
asymmetries and rank deficiencies in serial correlations of returns. Section 4 concludes. 
2 A Multivariate Market Microstructure Model 
In a multivariate extension of Kyle [1985], we consider n synchronous asset markets where 
market makers compete in terms of prices after observing the net order flow submitted 
by traders in each market. Let Pt E Rn denote the vector of equilibrium prices quoted by
the market makers in period t. These quotes can be made dependent only on the volume 
in each market separately. Let Zt E Rn denote the vector of net noise trades in the dealer
markets in period t. Let Yt E Rn denote the net trades from an informed trader. The
market makers observe the aggregate order flow, w1 = z1 + y1• After the dealer market
closes, the true value of the asset is revealed, perhaps through a second clearing in the 
Walrasian style. Let x, E Rn denote the vector of true values at the end of period t.
Conditioning on x,_1, let x1 be normally distributed with mean x,_1 and variance­
covariance I: and let z, be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance-covariance Z. 
We shall assume that the net order flow from noise traders in a market is uncorrelated 
with the corresponding true value of the asset. Market makers compete in a Bertrand 
fashion after observing the aggregate order flow. 
The informed trader observes a signal ()1 E Rn before orders are submitted in the
dealership market. The signal is normally distributed with mean x,_1 and variance­
covariance matrix 3. It is correlated with end-of-period values, as follows:
E[(IJ, - Xt-1)(xt - Xt-1)'] = I: . 
Consequently, we can write: 
()t = Xt + Et,
with E[ttlx,] = 0. Assume that the signals are uncorrelated with the order flows from
noise traders, z1• Assume also that the informed trader does not observe noise trades 
when submitting her orders. This assumption can be relaxed, at the cost of a substantial 
increase in the complexity of the equilibrium pricing rule. 
In a straightforward extension of Kyle [1985], one can show the existence of the 
following equilibrium. 
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, there exists a unique linear pricing rule, namely:
Pt = Xt-1 + Aw1, (1) 
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and 
Yt = B( B, - Xt-1). 
A= diag(,\;), where
,\; = �ff.;, 
where(;; denotes the ith diagonal element of Z, and
n n 
ai = I: I: O"i1D"ikez1, l=l k=l 
where �kl is element k, I of ::=:-1, and
(2) 
(3) 
The proof is in the appendix. Notice that the slope coefficient in the market makers' 
pricing function will be positive. To show that a; is positive, remember that a; = 
E;::::-1 E;, where E; denotes the ith column of E. This expression must be positive by the
positive-definiteness of :=:-1.
We are interested in the statistical properties of transaction prices, i.e., of the time 
series {p,-p,_i}�1. Obviously, E[p,-p,_1] = 0. Sincep,-p1_1 = (p,-x,_1)+(x,_1-p,_1), 
the following is easily derived (see the appendix) .
Proposition 1 
It follows that the matrix of first-order autocovariances of transaction prices will be sym­
metric. Although less straightforward to show, but nevertheless intuitive, Proposition 1 
implies that transaction prices will not be individually autocorrelated. In other words, 
the entries on the diagonal of the matrix of first-order autocovariances are all zero. We 
coliect these observations-in a, -corollary.
Corollary 1 
E[(Pit+1 - p;,)(PJt -PJt-1)] = E[(PJt+I - PJt)(p;, -Pit-1)], i ,j = 1, ... , n,
E[(Pit+I -Pit)(Pit - Pit-1)] = 0, i = 1, ... , n.
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Proof: see the appendix. The conclusions of this Corollary agree only in part with those 
of Chan [1991]. In particular, Chan obtains asymmetric cross-autocovariances when the
quality of his signals are unequal across securities (p. 18). In contrast, symmetry is ob­
tained here even when the signal-to-noise ratios are unequal. The difference stems from 
the presence of a strategic cross-market arbitrageur, who exploits the market makers' 
inability to incorporate information from the order flow of other securities in his pricing. 
Of additional interest is the varianceccovariance matrix of changes .in transaction 
prices, Pt -p,_1, and its relationship to the varianceccovariance matrix of changes in the
"true values", x, - x,_1• Since the latter could be associated with clearing prices in a
traditional Walrasian market, they could be considered to be restricted by a traditional 
asset pricing model such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The transaction prices, 
however, will not be restricted in the same way, but we can learn about the variance­
covariance matrix of the "true values" (the main ingredient of an asset pricing model) 
from the variance-covariance matrix of transaction prices. The following proposition 
provides the relationship between the two. 
Proposition 2 
E= 
E[(Pt - Pt-1)(Pt -Pt-1)1] + E[(Pt+1 -Pt)(Pt -Pt-1)'] 
+ E[(p, - Pt.:.1)(Pt+i -p,)']. 
Proof: see the appendix. The relationship between the variance-covariance matrix of 
the transaction prices and that of the "true values" is identical to the one in Cohen, 
e.a. [1983] between the variance-covariance matrix of the observed prices and that of the
underlying value process. They, however, derive this relationship from an exogenously 
specified process for transaction prices (their eqn. (2)). Obviously, the estimator of the
variance-covariance matrix in their paper is the right estimator of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the "true values" in the present model, E. 
Because of the low signal-to-noise ratio in asset return data, empirical research often 
focuses on the returns of portfolios rather than individual assets, in order to extract more 
precise information from the data. Consequently, we should investigate the implications 
of the foreg-0ing:.for-.por.tfalios.--Consider.,a,.s@t.-0f-m-.po1Meli0s-(m < n). Each can be
characterized by a vector q1 E Rn of weights (i.e., qfe = 1, where e denotes the vector of
ones). Let Q be then X m matrix having the vectors qi, l = 1, ... , m, as its columns. We
define positively-weighted portfolios as those for which q1 > 0. 
Consider the sequence of changes in the transaction prices of them portfolios, { Q'(p1-
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Pt-1 )}�1. From Proposition 1, we obtain the following. Define: 
Corollary 2 If
n n 
Gij = LL O"ikO"/jC1·
k=l l=l 
Gij (ij O -�-- > 
.,;a;a; � ' 
then the dealership market returns on positively-weighted portfolios will be positively au­
tocorrelated. 
Again, the proof is in the appendix. Notice that we obtain positive autocorrelation of 
index (positively weighted portfolios) returns without reference to non trading. Lo and 
MacKinlay [1991] have investigated the impact of nontrading and concluded that this 
phenomenon is insufficient to explain the degree of positive autocorrelation in index 
returns. Corollary 2 provides an alternative explanation. The sufficient condition for
positive index autocorrelation in Corollary 2 is satisfied, for instance, for positive a;;
(this essentially requires positive correlation between "true values" and between signals) 
and zero (ij (uncorrelated noise trades). Positive autocorrelation of index returns 1s
precisely what has been observed in the data (see, e.g., Lo and MacKinlay [1990]). 
Two further remarks should be made. First, if the condition of Corollary 2 is not
satisfied, index returns might not be positively correlated. For instance, it can be shown 
that if E and 3 are diagonal (uncorrelated "true values" and signals) whereas Z � 0
(i.e.,(;  � 0, all i,j), then index returns will be negatively autocorrelated. Second, the 
expression in the condition of Corollary 2 is the cross-autocovariance between asset i's
and asset j's prices. Notice that this cross-autocovariance is not always positive, unlike 
in Chan [1991] (p. 17). The presence of a strategic cross-market arbitrageur upsets his 
result. 
W hat about off-diagonal elements in the matrix of autocovariances of positively 
weighted portfolios? In order to avoid trivial results, let us assume that Q, the ma­
trix of portfolio weights, is of full rank. In addition, let us assume that E has nonzero 
entries everywhere (E # 0). This can be relaxed: one basically needs a minimum number 
of nonzero off-diagonal elements. Nevertheless, the assumption is not irrealistic from an 
equilibrium asset pricing point of view. E represents the variance-covariance matrix of
the "true values" of the assets in the economy, x,. They assume meaning in the neoclassi­
cal context if we identify them with the clearing prices of a Walrasian market (as opposed 
to p,, which is the vector of transaction prices in the dealership market). In the absence
of arbitrage opportunities, the elements of x, should satisfy (see, e.g., Chamberlain and
Rothschild [1983]): 
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for some random variables Pt+I · Pit+I is the payoff from selling asset i in the subsequent
dealership market. Since Pt+I is common to all asset values, one can expect a minimum
level of correlation. 
These assumptions lead to the following corollary. 
Corollary 3 The matrix of first-order autocovariances of changes in transaction prices.
of portfolios is symmetric and full-rank. 
Proof: see appendix. The conclusions of Corollary 3 contrast singularly with the empirical 
results. As the evidence in Lo and MacKinlay [1990] shows, the matrix of first-order 
autocovariances of index returns is asymmetric. Moreover, from earlier studies (Gibbons 
and Ferson [1985]), we know that it is rank-deficient. In other words, while the model is 
capable of explaining some of the empirical findings, such as positive autocorrelation of 
positively weighted portfolio returns, it cannot explain (1) asymmetry, (2) rank deficiency.
Rather than abandoning the model altogether, let us investigate next whether restrictions 
on the strategy space of the insider can explain the empirical findings. In particular, 
assume that the insider decides to optimize over strategies that are easy to execute. In 
the context of securities trading, there is an obvious restriction one can impose: the 
insider's actions are limited to the trading of a number of pre-determined portfolios. 
3 Restrictions on the Insider's Strategies 
Before, the insider's orders, y,, were an unrestricted vector in Rn. Assume now that
the insider limits his actions to trading I< portfolios (I< < n ). Let q1 be the vector of
weights corresponding to the Ith portfolio (I = 1, .. ., I<). Construct an n X f( matrix Q
by incorporating the ij_1s as columns. The insider's actions are limited to trading the f( 
portfolios if Yt lies in the span of Q, i.e.,
Yt = CJT/t, (4) 
for some T/t E RK. Given the (diagonal) matrix of slope coefficients of market makers'




Lemma 2 does not provide an expression for A, but this can be derived as in equation (3).
A has the slope coefficients of the market makers' pricing functions, the >.;s, on its diag­
onal. Because of the restriction on the insider's trading strategy, >.; will not necessarily 
be positive. No >.; can be negative, however (it means that the insider faces a downward 
sloping supply curve for some security). But some can be zero. We will ignore this com­
plication, and assume that the necessary restrictions on E, :=: and Z are satisfied for all 
>.;s to be strictly positive. 
From Lemma 2, it is straightforward to prove the following proposition. 
Proposition 3 




Proof: see the appendix. The second and third terms on the right-hand side of the 
expression in this proposition are clearly symmetric. The first one is generally not. 
Indeed, assume: 
Q = [ -�·]. 
In words, the insider trades one equally-weighted portfolio. Let er;, denote element i, j
of E:=:-1E1• Element i,j of E:=:-1E1Q(Q'AQ)-1Q1A' equals: 
whereas element j, i equals: 
1 n 
2 >.i I:; cr]k· n k=1 
These elementswillcin-general-not-Oe&:J.ual (despite�h<" .fac�·that ·ai; =-crj;) . Consequently,
the matrix of first-order autocovariances is generally asymmetric. We state this as a 
corollary. 
· 
Corollary 4 In general,
E[(Pit+t -Pit)(Pit - Pit-tl] =J E[(P;t+1 -Pit)(Pit -Pit-1)] , i,j = 1, ... ,n, i =J j.
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The matrix of first-order autocovariances will still be full-rank, because of the pres­
ence of AZ A'. In other words, the restriction on insider's strategies that we imposed is
not able to explain the rank deficiency of the matrix of first-order autocovariances. One 
obtains rank deficiency, however, by restricting the insider's strategies even more, and 
by analyzing the outcome as securities are added to the economy (n--+ oo) . 
Assume that the insider trades only it one asymptotically well-diversified portfolio. 
(The subsequent analysis can easily be changed to accomodate.trade in more than one 
portfolio.) An asymptotically well-diversified portfolio is defined as follows. Consider the 
sequence of economies indexed by the number of assets, n. Consider the �orresponding
sequence of weights of the insider's portfolio (represented by the vector Qn), Qf. The
portfolio is asymptotically well-diversified if: 
Qi=O(�), 
I.e., 
lim nQi = C,n-co 
where ICI < oo . This is satisfied, for instance, when Qn is an equally-weighted portfolio
(Qi=�). 
The insider's strategies are restricted to trades in one asymptotically well-diversified 
portfolio. If this portfolio is the market portfolio, the insider's actions correspond to 
timing the market: the insider uses his superior information to predict the future course 
of the market portfolio and to invest accordingly. 
A sequence of matrices will be considered to be asymptotically rank-deficient if it 
converges to a rank-deficient matrix. Mathematically, if An is n x n, then the sequence
{An};;'=1 is asymptotically rank-deficient if An--+ A*, with rank(A*) = K < oo. (Con­
vergence of matrices can be defined in different ways; it suffices that the 2-norm, i.e., 
the largest eigenvalue, of the difference An - A* converge to zero.) We are now able to 
prove the following. 
Proposition 4 If the insider trades only in one asymptotically well-diversified portfolio,
then the matrix of first-order autocovariances of changes in the transaction prices of the 
n securities will asymptote to a rank-one matrix. 
The proof is in the appendix. It consists of two parts. First, it is shown that the 
slope coefficients of market makers' pricing strategies are 0( � ). Second, An zn An (the
superscripts indicate that these matrices change as securities are added to the economy)
is shown to converge to 0. The latter convergence is very fast. Indeed, AnznAn = o(�),
i.e., if (i:t denotes element i, j of An zn An, then: 
lim n(;*,·n = 0.n-co (5) 
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In words, if the insider restricts his trades to one well-diversified portfolio, then the 
matrix of first-order autocovariances of transaction prices in very large economies is of 
rank one. This is exactly what Gibbons and Ferson [1985] find. 
Notice the speed of convergence in equation (5): the matrix of first-order· autocovari­
ances converges at the rate n to a rank-deficient matrix. In other words, in sufficiently 
large but finite economies, this matrix will be near rank-deficient. Because of the sam­
pling error, statistical tests of the rank of.the first-order autocovariance.matrix (such as 
the one in Bossaerts [1988], which is based on canonical correlations) will not be able to 
distinguish clearly between a near rank-deficient and a rank-deficient matrix. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper has shown how restrictions on the insider's strategies can explain some of 
the stylized facts about transaction prices. In particular, if the insider trades only pre­
determined, well-diversified portfolios, the matrix of first-order autocovariances is asym­
metric and (asymptotically) rank-deficient. Without such restrictions, this matrix would 
be symmetric and full-rank. 
One wonders whether other changes to Kyle's insider trading model would produce 
a similar outcome. To the best of this author's knowledge, restrictions on the strategy 
space of the insider are the only way to explain asymmetry and rank deficiency. If there 
are multiple insiders, each specializing in a (potentially overlapping) subset of markets, 
the matrix of first-order autocovariances of transaction prices will be block-symmetric 
and full-rank. If each specializes in just one market, asymmetry will result (as in Chan 
[1983], where there are no cross-market arbitrageurs), but rank deficiency will not. 
The next step would be to develop the methodology to distinguish between the two 
explanations for rank-deficient matrices of first-order autocovariances. This paper pro­
vided one based on asymmetric information. As mentioned in the Introduction, Hol­
lifield [1991], however, also obtained rank restrictions, within a representative investor 
asset pricing model, by imposing a dynamic factor structure on the endowment processes. 
Which of the two explanations is more likely to have generated the rank deficiencies that 
we observe in return data? The answer to this question is left for future research. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
On the one hand, the insider correctly posits the pricing strategy Pt = x,_1 + Aw,.
Consequently, he maximizes the following expression with respect to y,: 
E[y;(x, -p,)IO,] = E[y;(x, - Xt-1 - Aw,) JO,] 
= E[y;(x, - x,_1 -Az, -Ay,)10,]. 
The first-order conditions are: 
E[x,IO,] -Xt-1 = 2Ay,. 
E[x,IO,] = Xt-1 + I;:=:-1(0, - Xt-1), hence:
On the other hand, the market makers compete in a Bertrand fashion. As in Kyle 
[1985], the normality assumption will imply: 
But 
.\ - E[(Xit - Xit-1)Wit] ' E[wf,] .
1 a; E[(xit -Xit-1)w;,] = 2 Ai,
where ai = L:/=1 Lk=l O"izlJ"ik�kl, and
Consequently, 
r 2] 1 a; E.wit = (;; + 4 ;,2.
1 " -= 
\ 2,\; Ai = ? 1 a· ' <,ii + 4 ',\! 
• 
' 
a quadratic equa.ti=-�n .\;-,-with.as positi:ve roGt: 
0 
1 1  
Proof of Proposition 1: 
D 
E[(Pt+i -Pt)(Pt -Pt-1)'] 
E[(Pt+l - Xt + Xt -Pt)(p, -Xt-1 + Xt-1 -Pt-1)']
- E[(x, -p,)(Pt - Xt-1)1] 
- E[(x, -x,_1 -Aw,)(x,_1 +Aw, -x,_1)'] 
= EB'A' -AZA' -AB'2.B'A' 
- �y:,2-1E1 -AZA'. 4 
Proof of Corollary 1: The first result is obvious by inspection. As to the second result,
D 
E[(Pit+l - Pit)(Pit - Pit-il] 
1 n n - 4 I: I: a,w,kcd ->.7(ii1=1 k=l 
1 1 °'i 
= 4°'i - 4 (ii (ii
0. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
E[(Pt - Pt-1)(p, - Pt-1)'] 
- E[(Pt -Xt-1 + Xt-1 -Pt-1)(Pt -Xt-1 + Xt-1 -Pt-1)']
- AB'2.B'A' + AZA' + E -EB'A' + AZA'
+ AB=:.B'A' -ABE'
E - �E'='-1E' + 2AZA'- 2 -
- E -2E[(Pt+1 - Pt)(Pt - Pt-1)'] 
- E -E[(Pt+i - Pt)(Pt - Pt-1)'] - E[(Pt -Pt-1)(Pt+i -p,)']. 
The last equality follows from the symmetry of the matrix of first-order autocovariances. 
D 
Proof of Corollary 2: The diagonal elements of the matrix of first-order autocovariances
of transaction prices equal 0 (see Corollary 1). The off-diagonal elements can be written
as follows. 
E[(Pit+l - Pit)(PJt - PJt-1)] 
, n n 
� I: I: 17ikl7/je;:, - >.,>.j(ijk=l 1=1 
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Consequently, the off-diagonal elements (and positively weighted averages of the off­
diagonal elements) will be positive if 
. °'ij - (ij > 0 .
.;a;a; J (;i(jj
D 
Proof of Corollary 3: Symmetry follows from the symmetry of E[(Pt+1 - Pt)(Pt - Pt-l )'].
Moreover, 
rank(Q'E[(Pt+t - Pt)(p, - Pt-1 )']Q) 
= rank(Q'(�E::::-1 E' - AZA')Q)
< min{rank(Q), rank(�E:=:-1 E' - AZA')}.
Barring trivial results, �E:=:-1 E' -AZA', a matrix with zeros on the diagonal but nonzeros
elsewhere, will be of full rank. But Q is of full rank. Hence, the matrix of first-order 
autocovariances of the portfolio prices will be of full rank (ignoring the cases when the 
above inequality is satisfied as a strict inequality). D 
Proof of Lemma 2: The insider maximizes the following expression:
E[y;(x, - Pt)]= 
E[17;Q1(x, - Xt-1 - Az, - AQ17,)]. 
The first-order conditions are: 
Q'(E[xtlBt] - Xt-1 ) = 2Q' AQ17,.
D 
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Proof of Proposition 3: 
D 
E[(Pt+1 - Pt)(p, -Pt-1 )'] 
E[(P1+1 - x, + x, - p,)(p, -Xt-1 + Xt-1 - Pt-1)'] 
E[(x, -p,)(p, -x,_1)'] 
E[(x, -x,_1 - Aw,)(x,_1 +Aw, - x,_1)'] 
EBQ'Q'A' -AZA' -AQBi.J2Bi.J'QA' 
- �E2-1E'Q(Q'AQt1Q'A' -AZA'
-�AQ(Q'AQ)-1Q1E'3-1E1Q(Q'AQ)-1Q1A1•4 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
As in the proof of Lemma 1, market makers will set prices such that 
From Lemma 2:
A
· _  E[(xit - Xi1-1)wit] ' - E[w�,] . 
1 ai E[(x·1 -x·· 1)w·1] = --i i�- i 2 �i ' 
h • . - 'C"'n Q• . 'C"'n 'C"'n . . t• d \. - Q' AQ AJ w ere O'.i - L...j=l J Wl=I Wk=I aJ/O'ik':.kl' an Ai Qi . so,
Consequently, 
where 5. = Q' AQ. 
Now verify that Ai = O(i)· If so,
14 
i.e.,,\ = 0(!2 ).
1. 1 'Im 
- Q; 
n-+oo n2 




j=l l=l k=I 
= C2, IC2I < oo, 
i.e.,&; = O(n2). Consequently,
Next, 
,),2 1 
-, = 0(-). 
Q[ n
2 
1. 1 I:;n 
Q
' ' 
Im - ·Q· 
n--+00 n2 J Jj=l 
1 n ' ii· 
Ji,�; l:;(nQ1)(n�) J=I 
C3, IC3I < oo, 
i.e., L:'J=1 Q1ii1 = O(n2). It follows that
Jim n.X; 
n�oo 
i.e., .X; = O(�), as required.
Using these facts, it follows that the elements of AZA' will be o(�). As to the elements
of l'.BQ'A', element i, j equals
1 n • -L O";kBJi(n.X1), (6) n k=I 
where B� is element j, k of BQ. The expression in (6) is 0(1). Finally, element i, j of
ABQ3BQ' A' ,equals:
1 n • 1 n . 
- l:;(n.X;)BJ(- I:;�1kBJi(n.X1)),n l=I n k=l 
which is 0(1 ). From the expression in Proposition 3, it follows that the matrix of first­
order autocovariances equals the difference between a matrix of rank one with elements 
that are 0(1), and a matrix of full rank whose elements are o(�). The result of the
proposition follows immediately. D 
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